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ing Act to assure that the decisions are not illegal, arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion, but has gone further to say
that it will assure that the process through which these decisions
are formulated affords all parties procedural due process of law.
The extension of the scope of review made by Bank of Smithfield
seems desirable in that conformance to procedural due process, in-
cluding notice, hearing, and an opportunity for all parties to intro-
duce and examine evidence, is necessary to formulate a complete
record of the Comptroller's deliberations; and a complete record is
the only adequate basis on which a court can subsequently review
the decisions for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or abuse of dis-
cretion. By using the Administrative Procedure Act as authority
for granting this new remedy to those deprived of procedural due
process in proceedings of the Comptroller, the court seems to be
applying the act in the spirit in which the United States Supreme
Court has said it should be applied.4"
RALPH JACOBS
Constitutional Law-Dismissal of Jury after judge Coerces Guilty
Plea Constitutes Reversible Error-Retrial thereafter Is
Not Double jeopardy
Tateo was brought to trial before a jury in a federal court on
four counts of bank robbery and one of kidnaping. On the fourth
day of the trial, the judge informed Tateo's counsel that if Tateo
insisted on continuing with the trial through the jury verdict and
was convicted, sentencing would be arranged so that Tateo would be
imprisoned for the rest of his life.1 Tateo was notified of these
statements and warned by his counsel that the probability of con-
viction was high. Accordingly, he changed his plea to guilty. The
plea was accepted, and the jury dismissed. The judge then sentenced
Tateo to twenty-two years and six months in prison.2
" See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953).
1 Tateo's attorney later testified, unchallenged by the Government, that
the trial judge had stated: "I think I ought to tell you this. If you finish the
trial and your clients are found guilty, I'm going to start off by imposing
a life sentence on the kidnapping charge and then I'm going to add con-
secutive maximum sentences on the other counts on which they are found
guilty." United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). At
this later hearing, Tateo testified that he was unaware that the judge was un-
able to impose consecutive sentences. Ibid.
'At the time the sentence was imposed the prosecution agreed to de-
fendant's motion of dismissal of the kidnaping count. Id. at 562.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Seven years later Tateo made a motion before another judge
asking that the judgment of conviction be vacated. The judgment
of conviction was set aside, and a new trial was granted3 on the
grounds that his guilty plea had not been freely rendered. At the
new trial, a third judge found that Tateo's only consent to the
dismissal of the jury by the original trial judge had been in the
form of a coerced plea. No "exceptional circumstances" such as
would permit a retrial were found to have motivated the jury release.
Therefore, all counts against Tateo were dismissed.4 The Govern-
ment appealed,' and in United States v. Tateo,8 the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court held that the dismissal of the jury before ver-
dict after coercion of a guilty plea constituted error and that retrial
of the defendant under such circumstances did not amount to double
jeopardy.
The concept of former, or double, jeopardy was recognized in
the common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict,7
which were, said Blackstone, "grounded on this universal maxim
of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence."' These
'Ibid. At this hearing the judge said:
No matter how heinous the offense charged, how overwhelming the
proof of guilt may appear, or how hopeless the defense, a defendant's
right to continue with his trial may not be violated. His constitutional
right to require the Government to proceed to a conclusion of the trial
and to establish guilt by independent evidence should not be exercised
under the shadow of a penalty.
Id. at 567.
' United States v. Tateo, 216 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 63 COLUm.
L. Rnv. 1329, 16 STAN. L. REv. 713 (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958) provides:
An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from
the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all
criminal cases in the following instances:
.... From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when
the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.
The Government may not appeal a jury verdict of acquittal. Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). A defendant may appeal a verdict of
guilty, and if the conviction is set aside, the defendant may be tried again
for the same offense. At the new trial the defendant takes the chance of
receiving a more severe penalty. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
However, a charge more serious than the previous conviction cannot be
brought. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
8377 U.S. 463 (1964).
74 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-36. See generally Sigler, A History
of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 283 (1963); Kirk, "Jeopardy"
During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 602 (1934).
84 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335.
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pleas did not lie unless the defendant had been either convicted or
acquitted by a jury, and they were usually available only in capital
felony cases.' However, a defendant who had once been before a
jury always had one of these pleas available because the juries at
early common law were never discharged until a verdict was ren-
dered.' ° By Blackstone's day, however, it was recognized that a
jury could be released before it had reached a verdict and that the
defendant could be retried again if the jury dismissal was for
reasons of "evident necessity.""
The common law concept of double jeopardy was carried over
and embodied in the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which
provides, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . -"' Jeopardy is held to
See id. at *335-36.
10 COKE, THIRD INSTITUTES *110: "To fpeak it here once for all, if any
person be indicted of treafon, or of felony, or larceny, and plead not guilty,
and thereupon a jury is retorned, and fworn, their verdict must be heard,
and they cannot be difcharged ....
" 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *360.
"
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. All state constitutions have provisions against
double jeopardy except those of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, and Vermont. In the states without a constitutional pro-
vision, the plea of double jeopardy is part of the common law. See ALI,
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW § 6, comment (Proposed Final
Draft 1935). For a complete list of the state constitutional provisions, see
ibid.
It is imperative to note the distinction between the double jeopardy
protection provided in federal proceedings and that provided in state pro-
ceedings. Compare Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), where
retrial after a mistrial had been declared because of the unpreparedness of
the prosecution was held improper under the fifth amendment, with Brock
v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953), where retrial after a mistrial had
been declared because of the unpreparedness of the prosecution was held
proper under the fourteenth amendment. Compare Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184 (1957), where the defendant's conviction of first degree
murder following his successful appeal from a conviction of second degree
murder was held to violate the fifth amendment, with Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), where defendant's conviction of first degree murder
following the state's successful appeal from a conviction of second degree
murder was held proper under the fourteenth amendment.
State courts sometimes apply stricter standards of double jeopardy than
do federal courts. Compare Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), where
the Court held that the fifth amendment provided no protection against a
more severe sentence on retrial after a successful appeal from a former
conviction, with People v. Henderson, 29 Cal. 2d 297, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1963), where the court held that a defendant who had his prior
sentence of life imprisonment overturned on appeal could not be sentenced
to death for the same offense on retrial.
[Vol. 43
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attach when the jury is impaneled and sworn13 or, in a nonjury trial,
when the court commences to take evidence.14 The question of the
effect of the constitutional provision against double jeopardy on
retrial after the dismissal of a jury that has been impaneled and
sworn was first considered by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Perez.5 There, a judge discharged a jury because the jurors were
unable to agree on a verdict. The Court held that a jury dismissal
before verdict in this "hung jury" situation did not bar retrial.
Perez formulated the standard that a defendant's criminal trial
may be validly terminated short of a verdict, rendering retrial not
violative of the double jeopardy clause, where "'there is a manifest.
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise
be defeated."'6
Most of the cases involving jury dismissals before verdict since
Perez have been held to fall within one or the other of these ex-
ceptions to the retrial prohibition. Termination of the trial before
verdict has been held justified where the judge released the jury
because of an improper line of questions pursued by the prosecution
after warnings by the judge,'1 the illness of the judge,' the trial
'"E.g., Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States
v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d
69 (9th Cir. 1931).
"E.g., Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916); McCarthy v.
Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 610 (1936). The
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) provides
that jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn.
822 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
"Id. at 580. (Emphasis added.) Most of the states agreed that a
defendant's criminal trial may be terminated short of a verdict where there
is a "manifest necessity" or in the interests of "public justice." E.g., Baker
v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 165, 132 S.W.2d 766 (1939); State v. Tyson,
138 N.C. 627, 50 S.E. 456 (1905). North Carolina, which derives its
double jeopardy protection from the common law, classifies the types of
necessity warranting discharge of a jury into "physical necessity" and
"necessity of doing justice." "Physical necessity" has been defined as "physi-
cal and absolute," such as a juror's illness or insanity of the defendant
during the trial. State v. Wiseman, 68 N.C. 203, 205 (1873). "Necessity
of doing justice" has been defined as a duty of the court "to guard the
administration of justice from fraudulent practices; as in the case of tamper-
ing with the jury, or keeping back the witnesses on the part of the prosecu-
tion, by the prisoner." Id. at 205-06. Accord, State v. Crocker, 239 N.C.
446, 450, 80 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1954), 32 N.C.L. REv. 526. See generally 31
N.C.L. REv. 313 (1953).
'
7 Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961), 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 730.
"Freeman v. United States, 237 Fed. 815 (2d Cir. 1916).
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judge's belief that his own remarks had been prejudicial,19 the ap-
parent insanity of a juror,2" the illness of a juror,21 a hung jury,2
the disqualification of a juror,23 a prejudiced juror,24 an erroneous
admission by counsel of the defendant and his subsequent with-
drawal from the case,25 the consent of the defendant 20 a military
movement during time of war,2 7 or prejudicial articles in news-
papers.28 Thus, where the judge discharges the jury to protect the
interests of the defendant or under circumstances where the con-
tinuation of the trial would be likely to result in an unfair trial,
the jury release has been held proper.
On the other hand, dismissal of a jury has been held improper,
and a retrial has been barred where the jury dismissal is for reasons
other than to safeguard the interests of the defendant or the cir-
cumstances did not justify the conclusion that a continuation of
the trial would likely result in unfairness. Thus, discretionary
termination of a trial by a judge before a jury verdict has been
rendered has been held improper where the prosecution was unable
to continue because of the absence of its witnesses,20 the prosecutor
entered a zolle prosequi because his evidence appeared insufficient,3 0
"United States v. Giles, 19 F. Supp. 1009 (W.D. Okla. 1937).
"°Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 831 (1951).
"'United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
584 (1941).
" E.g., Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909) ; Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579
(1824).
"E.g., Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (member of
the grand jury).
"E.g., Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (letter written
by defendant's counsel could have influenced a juror); United States v.
Cimino, 224 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (juror stated he had
an opinion prejudicial to the accused).
2r Scott v. United States, 202 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952).
" Blair v. White, 24 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1928).
"
7 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
2' United States v. Montgomery, 42 F.2d 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
2 Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Cornero v. United
States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931) ; United States v. Watson, 28 Fed. Cas.
499 (No. 16,651) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868). But see United States v. Coolidge,
25 Fed. Cas. 622 (No. 14,858) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815), upholding retrial where
a mistrial was declared when a witnesses refused to testify on religious
grounds.
o Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
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or the judge was under an erroneous belief that the defense counsel
had engaged in misconduct.3 1
The Perez standard applies only to termination-before-verdict
cases and has no application to cases of final judgment. If final
judgment has been rendered there can be no retrial, except where
the defendant's conviction has been reversed on appeal, for he is then
deemed to have waived his right not to be tried twice.2
A problem in Tateo is whether the case should be considered as a
termination-before-verdict case or as a case of final judgment. If
the guilty plea of the defendant is considered a conviction, then Tateo
can be viewed as a judgment case. At least one writer is of the
opinion that Tateo might be a case of final judgment because the
jury was discharged without the judge exercising his discretion.3
However, a consideration of Tateo as a judgment case disregards
the overbearing role played by the judge. It was the judge who
compelled the defendant to plead guilty. It was this same judge who
accepted the guilty plea. Thus, it is difficult to understand how the
actions of the judge-the prime mover in the events leading to the
dismissal of the jury-were not discretionary, thereby making Tateo
a mistrial case.
If Tateo is a case which can be classified as a mistrial, it would
still be necessary to appraise the circumstances under the Perez stan-
"'United States v. Whitlow, 110 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1953).
" See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). The majority in
Tateo equated the improprieties at the trial level to cases involving reversal
due to error. See also Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1959)
(conviction overthrown due to erroneous instructions concerning the statute
of limitations); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950) (conviction
overthrown on grounds of insufficient evidence); United States v. Stroud,
251 U.S. 15 (1919) (conviction overthrown due to confession of error by
Solicitor General). A second theory justifying retrial of a defendant after
he is successful in an appeal from a conviction is that the first trial is a
nullity. See Flynn v. United States, 217 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 930 (1955). A third theory, advocated by Mr. justice
Holmes but never accepted by the Supreme Court, is that the originaljeopardy extends to the appeal and the new trial. See Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1903) (dissenting opinion). See also Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962), where an erroneous directed verdict
was held to bar retrial, not because the trial was improperly terminated
before verdict, but because the case was considered one of final judgment.
" 16 STAiN. L. REv. 713, 718 (1964); accord, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1329,
1333-34 (1963). Both of these notes were written on the district court
opinion, which held that retrial was barred because the jury was improperly
discharged before verdict. United States v. Tateo, 216 F. Supp. 850
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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dard to determine whether the jury release was proper. The latest
decision applying the Perez standard, Downum v. United States,84
held that a jury dismissal due to unpreparedness of the prosecution
was improper and a bar to retrial because it did not fall within
the Perez exceptions. In Tateo, the Court was divided on the sig-
nificance of Downum. The majority distinguished jury discharges
due to prosecutorial negligence and jury discharges after coercion
of the defendant by the trial judge. Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented
and stated that the majority unjustifiably limited Downm to its
particular facts. He was of the opinion that coercion by the trial
judge is an even more severe abuse of a defendant's rights than is
prosecutorial negligence.35 The majority, however, found support
for its decision to allow retrial on the questionable assumption that
granting Tateo immunity from retrial because a trial judge coerced
his guilty plea would necessarily result in similar immunity after all
trial reversals due to error.8 6
It is submitted that Tateo should be considered a mistrial case-
i.e., one where the judge improperly chose to exercise his discretion
and terminate the trial before the jury reached a verdict. The judge
himself coerced the plea that resulted in dismissal of the jury. Such
a termination before verdict is not within "manifest necessity" or
in the interests of "public justice," the only circumstances justifying
retrial under the Perez rule.
RAYMOND W. RUSSELL
Constitutional Law-jury Selection-Defendant Not a Member of
the Excluded Class
In Allen v. State,1 the Georgia Court of Appeals was faced with
the question of whether the constitutional rights of a white de-
fendant were violated by the systematic exclusion of Negroes from
-"372 U.S. 734 (1963).
" "If anything, Tateo's deprivation is more serious. The purpose of the
judicial coercion in his case was to deny him the right to have the impaneled
jury decide his fate, whereas this was merely the effect of prosecutorial
negligence in Downum." United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 473 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 466. In England, unlike the United States, reversal due to
error means that the defendant goes free. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 § 4.
See generally KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ENGLAND (1963).
'137 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964).
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